Wundt considers none of these various perspectives dispensable, since each one is a complement necessary for total science. There is just one empirical world and reality, but many irreducible varieties of experience.
As we have seen, Wundt was concerned not only with expanding the set of known psychological facts, but also with interpreting them within an appropriate explanatory framework. Of course, the necessity of establishing such a closed framework distinct from physiology amounted to distinguishing psychological causality from physical causality in general, and hence psychology from the natural sciences altogether. As these relationships are laid out below, it must always be remembered that although these four areas—psychology, philosophy, natural science, human science—are irreducible, this irreducibility is not a metaphysical or ontological one, but merely one of explanatory function and commensurate methodology.
They do not have distinct objects, but again merely represent ways of describing irreducible perspectives upon the same object, namely experience. Objects of science do not in and of themselves yield starting points for a classification of the sciences. Rather, it is only regarding the concepts that these objects call for that we can undertake this classification. Therefore, the same object [ Gegenstand ] can become the object [ Objekt ] of several sciences: geometry, epistemology, and psychology each deals with space, but space is approached in each discipline from a different angle.
SP I: 12—3; cf. The most obvious is that neither can lay claim to synthetic knowledge that is not founded or also describable in terms of the natural or human sciences. Hence, while strictly speaking he is committed to considering psychology i. This is because psychology is hybrid , adapting scientific methodologies to its particular aims; in this sense psychology, although part of philosophy, synthesizes facts, just like the sciences.
By contrast, its negative or critical role is to regulate the sciences in accord with the imperative of consistent systematicity. This explanation then provides to philosophy the scientific foundation for its pure task. The former include mathematics; the latter study the natural and spiritual aspects of reality, [ 49 ] and correspondingly are divided into the natural and the human sciences.
The former just is the science of psychology; the latter includes the general study of these products as such e. Since the process precedes the product cf.
In this way psychology as a science mediates between the sciences and philosophy. For Wundt, however, this task involves psychology, and indeed much of his Logik is devoted to this topic. As he reasonably points out, logic comprises the rules of correct thinking, and the principles of logic are known to us as conscious representations L I: 76; 13; cf. Wundt ; thinking and consciousness are objects of psychological inquiry; therefore any account of logic must include a psychological description of the genesis of logical principles L I: Even the normative character of logic had, in his view, to be given a psychological interpretation cf.
Farber , , ff. How can we reconcile these statements? Their psychological immediacy does not, Wundt thinks, compromise their normativity, since what is given in consciousness precisely is their normative character. Let us briefly describe these. Because, as was described above, thinking is. L I: 76—7. A thought [ Gedanke ] may exhibit immediate certainty, obvious without any mediating thought-acts; or a thought may be mediately certain, grounded in prior thought-acts.
Immediate and mediate evidence have their source and foundation in intuition Anschauung : immediate evidence immediately, mediate evidence mediately L I: 82—3. Intuition is not identical with evidence, for evidence only. By the standards of such philosophers as Husserl, Natorp, and Frege, Wundt appears committed to a logical psychologism.
But it is worth considering his response to this charge, for it again illustrates his monistic perspectivism. Wundt b: Wundt finds a simpler solution in his perspectivism. But there are no logical laws that are not also describable psychologically, just as there is no psychological phenomenon not also describable physiologically. The logical description saves the phenomenon of normativity, just as the psychological description saves the phenomenon of the interiority of consciousness.
This was not the outcome Wundt had desired. He never saw his psychological scientism as a threat to philosophy—on the contrary, he considered his psychology to be a part of philosophy cf. Boring , one necessary for philosophy to take its proper place in the totality of the sciences. Indeed, philosophy could only assume that position through the mediating position of psychology PP I: 3.
Yet academic philosophers, denied the possibility of any legislative or executive functions in the sciences, rejected the juridical ones as well, bitterly resisting contamination of their pure pursuit by the empiricism of the new psychology. In Germany, resistance was especially stiff among neo-Kantians, and later the Phenomenologists. If Wundt has a big idea, it is that Being is a single flow of Becoming with many sides and many ways of being described.
Consequently we , as part of this Being, have many ways of describing and explaining it. Few have as unblinkingly accepted the consequences of their starting points, or more doggedly pursued them to their various ends as Wundt. Boring has an excellent annotated bibliography , ff. Wong —3, and Fahrenberg Other Internet Resources : 10— Kim stonybrook.
Biographical Timeline 2. Experimental psychology: object and method 3. The theoretical framework of experimental psychology 6. The order of knowledge 7. L III: Wundt believes that one can experimentally correct for this problem by using, as much as possible, unexpected processes, processes not intentionally adduced, but rather such as involuntarily present themselves [ sich darbieten ].
L III: [ 19 ] In other words, it is in the controlled conditions of a laboratory that one can, by means of experimenter, experimental subject, and various apparatus, arbitrarily and repeatedly call forth precisely predetermined phenomena of consciousness.
L III: [ 20 ] A detailed account of these experiments themselves, however, lies far beyond the scope of this article. PP I: Now these various formulations [ 27 ] of WL admit, as Wundt says, of three different, and indeed incompatible interpretations; that is, there are three different conceptions of what WL is a law of.
In other words, WL does not apply to sensations in and for themselves, but to processes of apperception, without which a quantitative estimation of sensations could never take place. Wundt appeals to an analogy: This feature of consciousness can be clarified by that common image we use in calling consciousness an inner vision.
PP II: Thus consciousness is a function of the scope of attention, which may be broader as perception or narrower as apperception [ 34 ]. Hence the degree of apperception is not to be measured according to the strength of the external impression [i. Wundt writes: Association everywhere gives the first impetus to [apperceptive] combinations. Only in this way can one explain the well-known fact that we can easily and without trouble finish [composing] a complicated sentence-structure.
In other words, as the apperceptive activity becomes increasingly intense it seems as it were to rise above the field of perception, above the field of its own constructs, becoming aware of itself as pure activity, as pure self -consciousness: rooted in the constant activity [ Wirksamkeit ] of apperception, [self-consciousness] … retreats completely into apperception alone, so that, after the completion of the development of consciousness, the will appears as the only content of self-consciousness….
The theoretical framework of experimental psychology As we have seen Section 3. Wundt writes: Objects of science do not in and of themselves yield starting points for a classification of the sciences.
Because, as was described above, thinking is experienced immediately as an inner activity, … we must regard it as an act of will [ Willenshandlung ], and accordingly regard the logical laws of thought [ Denkgesetze ] as laws of the will. Intuition is not identical with evidence, for evidence only comes to be at the moment when logical thinking relates the contents of intuition and presupposes the relations of such intuitive contents as objectively given.
Bibliography Boring has an excellent annotated bibliography , ff. Kroner, Leipzig: Engelmann. Revised editions in , , , , , , , , , followed by five unaltered editions. See Boring Windelband ed. Grundlinien einer psychologischen Entwicklungsgeschichte der Menschheit , Leipzig: Barth. Creighton and E. Titchener trans. Judd trans. Washburn trans. Translation of part of Ethik Schaub trans.
Mead et al. Sebeok series ed. Secondary sources concerning Wundt Araujo, S. Ash, M. Blumenthal, A. CO;2-H Bringmann, W. Balance, and R.
Bringmann, W. Bringmann, and D. Bringmann, and W. Tweney ed. Brock, A. Eisler, R. Wundts Philosophie und Psychologie , Leipzig: Barth. Emmans, D. Laihinen eds. Wundt's background was in physiology, and this was reflected in the topics with which the Institute was concerned, such as the study of reaction times and sensory processes and attention. For example, participants would be exposed to a standard stimulus e. Wundt's aim was to record thoughts and sensations, and to analyze them into their constituent elements, in much the same way as a chemist analyses chemical compounds, in order to get at the underlying structure.
The school of psychology founded by Wundt is known as voluntarism, the process of organizing the mind. During his academic career Wundt trained graduate students in psychology.
This is significant as it helped disseminate his work. Indeed, parts of Wundt's theory were developed and promoted by his one-time student, Edward Titchener, who described his system as Structuralism , or the analysis of the basic elements that constitute the mind. Wundt wanted to study the structure of the human mind using introspection.
Wundt believed in reductionism. That is, he believed consciousness could be broken down or reduced to its basic elements without sacrificing any of the properties of the whole.
Wundt argued that conscious mental states could be scientifically studied using introspection. He trained psychology students to make observations that were biased by personal interpretation or previous experience, and used the results to develop a theory of conscious thought. After studying with Wundt, G. Wundt is often associated with the theoretical perspective known as structuralism, which involves describing the structures that compose the mind. Structuralism is regarded as the very first school of thought in psychology.
He believed that psychology was the science of conscious experience and that trained observers could accurately describe thoughts, feelings, and emotions through a process known as introspection.
However, Wundt made a clear distinction between everyday self-observation, which he believed was inaccurate, and experimental introspection also called internal perception. According to Wundt, internal perception involved a properly trained observer who was aware when a stimulus of interest was introduced.
Wundt's process required the observer to be keenly aware and attentive of their thoughts and reactions to the stimulus and involved multiple presentations of the stimulus.
Of course, because this process relies on personal interpretation, it is highly subjective. Wundt believed that systematically varying the conditions of the experiment would enhance the generality of the observations. While Wundt is typically associated with structuralism , it was actually his student Edward B. Titchener who influenced the structuralist school in America.
Many historians believe that Titchener actually misrepresented much of Wundt's original ideas. Instead, Wundt referred to his point of view as voluntarism. While Titchener's structuralism involved breaking down elements to study the structure of the mind, Blumenthal has noted that Wundt's approach was actually much more holistic. Wundt also established the psychology journal Philosophical Studies.
In a ranking of the most influential psychologists of the 20th century, Wundt was ranked at number The creation of a psychology lab established psychology as a separate field of study with its own methods and questions. Wilhelm Wundt's support of experimental psychology also set the stage for behaviorism , and many of his experimental methods are still used today. A number of other influential thinkers can also claim to be "fathers of psychology" in some way or another.
Wundt was not only the very first person to refer to himself as a psychologist; he also established psychology as a formal discipline separate from philosophy and biology.
While his introspective method does not meet the empirical rigor of research today, his emphasis on experimental methods did pave the way for the future of experimental psychology. Thanks to his work and contributions, a whole new field was established and inspired other researchers to explore and study the human mind and behavior. Obviously, not everyone is going to agree with these generalized titles.
A few people might suggest that Freud is the father of psychology since he is perhaps one of its most "known" figures. Others might suggest that Aristotle is the true father of psychology since he is responsible for the theoretical and philosophical framework that contributed to psychology's earliest beginnings. Still others might argue that those earliest researchers such as Helmholtz and Fechner deserve credit as the founders of psychology. No matter which side of the argument you are on, one thing that is easy to agree on is that all of these individuals had an important influence on the growth and development of psychology.
While the theories of each individual are not necessarily as influential today, all of these psychologists were important in their own time and had a major impact on how psychology evolved into what it is today.
Ever wonder what your personality type means? Sign up to find out more in our Healthy Mind newsletter. Rieber R, Robinson RW, eds. New York, NY: Springer; Henley T. Hergenhahn's An Introduction to the History of Psychology. Kim A. Wilhelm Maximilian Wundt.
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